Augustinianisms and Thomisms (Chapter Nine of the Cambridge Companion to Political Theology) by Gregory, Eric & Clair, Joseph
Digital Commons @ George Fox University
Faculty Publications - College of Christian Studies College of Christian Studies
2015
Augustinianisms and Thomisms (Chapter Nine of
the Cambridge Companion to Political Theology)
Eric Gregory
Joseph Clair
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ccs
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the English Language and Literature Commons
9 Augustinianisms and Thomisms 
ERIC GREGORY AND JOSEPH CLAIR 
INTRODUCTION 
The standard linage of Augustine and Aquinas that emerges in 
twentieth-century textbooks of political philosophy is that of two fun-
damentally opposed theological approaches to the political. Augustine, 
in one corner, is the clear-eyed realist, convinced that political society 
is fallen, mired in the consequences of original sin and the contingent 
necessity to restrain evil, vice, and sin. Aquinas, in the other corner, is 
the more cheerful Aristotelian, who emphasizes the inherent goodness 
and naturalness of political society and its beneficial purposes for human 
flourishing.' These contrasting visions continue to animate diverse 
Christian understandings of the limits and possibilities of politics. 
One extraordinary feature of these two interpretive pictures is the 
way that each was able to achieve rapprochement with the ideals of polit-
icalliberalism and their institutional expression in twentieth-century 
liberal democracies. By "political liberalism" we mean to refer, in a gen-
eral way, to modern ideals of equality, liberty, and freedom that can take 
a variety of institutional forms, but are essentially ordered by limited 
government, individual rights, the consent of the governed, constitu-
tionalism, and the rule of law. Crucially, most versions of political lib-
eralism presume to be indifferent to the ultimate goals and purposes of 
citizens, provided that they respect the laws and tasks necessary for the 
operation of responsible government. Theological rapprochement with 
political liberalism can also take a variety of forms - ranging from a 
more rigorous attempt to narrate the achievements of liberal democ-
racy as being indebted to specific Christian theological concepts, move-
ments, or practices, to a less ambitious program of describing the ways 
in which Christian commitments can be reconciled with the ideals and 
institutions constitutive of liberal democratic life. 
By the end of the century, the opposed interpretive pictures of 
Augustine and Aquinas were also able to inspire an opposite, shadow 
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argument for Augustinian and Thomistic antiliberalism. The story of 
this reconciliation and its reversal in the last decades of the twentieth 
century epitomizes the story of political Augustinianisms and 
Thomisms, and in some ways tells the story of political theology in 
Europe and America in the twentieth century in miniature. 
The Augustinian side of this story has received renewed attention 
in recent work in both political theology and discussions of religion 
in public life. While it is difficult to overstate the significance of vari-
ous retrievals of Aquinas for contemporary moral theology (especially 
in terms of natural law, virtue, and the structure of human action) 
and important forms of modernity criticism, their relation to political 
theology has been largely implicit. Notwithstanding the influence of 
Alasdair Macintyre and John Finnis, it is striking that few recent pro-
posals in political theology adopt an explicitly Thomist perspective. 
Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is time to reas-
sess this narrative and hopefully begin a new chapter. Telling a new, 
more accurate story will require reexamination of the standard inter-
pretive pictures and a reconstruction of each thinker's political thought 
in light of the demands of the present day. In this chapter, therefore, 
we argue for a revision of the standard interpretive pictures that brings 
Augustine and Aquinas closer together. Our argument creates a new 
vantage from which to imagine the application of their thought to the 
political challenges of the twenty-first century. 
Road Map 
In the first section of this chapter, we tell the story of the standard inter-
pretive pictures and their early to mid-century harmonization with 
political liberalism, and conclude with the reversals these conciliations 
suffer in the closing decades of the twentieth century. In the second sec-
tion we argue for a revision of these textbook interpretations that moves 
Augustine's and Aquinas's political thought closer together - specifically 
focusing on each thinker's understanding of the naturalness of political 
society and their compatible conceptions of political life and its role in 
human flourishing. Naturalness is a highly contested term in Augustine 
and Aquinas studies, especially given the thinkers' shared eschatological 
perspective that can be obscured by strong contrastive interpretations of 
the "natural" and "supernatural." Henri de Lubac's influential challenge 
to certain Neo-Thomist understandings of the opposition of the natural 
and supernatural remains central to contemporary theological debates, 
though strangely neglected in political theology. De Lubac's Augustinian 
Thomism, itself part of a longer tradition of mediation between our two 
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figures, strikes us as a plausible and neglected voice for reflection on the 
naturalness of politics. In a final section we take these points of congru-
ence just established and sketch a way toward an Augustinian-Thomist 
political theology, arguing that one can be both Augustinian and Tho mist 
in one's political attitudes and activities. 
Our argument, in short, is that Augustine has a stronger sense of 
the naturalness of political life than interpreters have seen, and that it 
is much more akin to Aquinas's than interpreters have suggested. The 
two thinkers fundamentally and primarily view political life as tempo-
ral: the relationship between the goods constitutive of temporal polit-
ical life and the eternal goods of ultimate human happiness form both 
the primary distinction and primary bridge between church and polit-
ical society. Augustine and Aquinas's shared eschatological eudaimo-
nism provides the lens through which to examine political liberalism 
and liberal democracy as a contingent political arrangement susceptible 
to affirmation and critique. 
THE STANDARD STORY OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
INTERPRETATIONS 
Thomist and Augustinian Reconciliation with 
Liberal Democracy 
Thomism 
The task of reconciling Aquinas's political thought with liberal democ-
racy gained new urgency after World War I. Neo-Thornist philosophers 
and Christian democratic parties in Europe and Latin America began 
developing and reformulating aspects of Thomist social thought in sup-
port of liberal theories of democracy and human rights. At the same 
moment in the United States, Mortimer Adler and Robert Hutchins 
interested a new generation of students in Neo-Thomism and Thomist 
political thought at the University of Chicago- as evidenced in the list of 
publications in the University of Chicago Press's Walgreen Foundation 
Series. Preeminent among these Neo-Thomist thinkers was Jacques 
Maritain (189I-I965), along with Yves Simon, Heinrich Rommen, Josef 
Fuchs, and others. 
Maritain's work in this period focuses largely on Aquinas's 
understanding of the naturalness of political society.2 Like others 
in this generation, he is responding to Pierre Rousselot's influential 
early-twentieth-century effort to find a place for Thomism in modern 
discussions of freedom and individual right .J For Aquinas, the natural 
common good achieved in political community stands apart from the 
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supernatural, eternal good found only in God, by grace, and is partially 
glimpsed in the ecclesial community. Aquinas's strong sense of the 
naturalness of political life for human flourishing then becomes cen-
tral to Maritain's approach in reformulating a Thomist endorsement of 
modern liberal democratic institutions.4 For it is this conception of a 
natural common good that provides a positive view of political society 
and its role in human flourishing, without also assigning it an ultimate 
role. That crucial limit provided protection from the excesses of a theo-
cratic European past and the threat of a totalitarian present. To assuage 
liberal anxieties about the perfectionist or communist tone of a privi-
leged common good in the wake of World War II, Maritain increasingly 
emphasizes Aquinas's thick conception of personhood and agency as he 
constructs a corresponding theory of rights to protect individuals from 
the excesses of state authority. 
Augustinianism 
There was an initial effort in the interwar period by Gustave Combes 
and others to identify the consonance between Augustine and Aquinas 
on the naturalness of political life and its natural common good.s Henri 
de Lubac, for example, cites himself in fundamental agreement with 
Combes's reading.6 But this program quickly came under fire and gave 
way to a Neo-Thomist rejection of Augustine's political thought on 
the grounds that it lacked a clear distinction between the natural and 
supernatural common good, applicable to religious and political life. 
This criticism is crystallized in the thesis of Henri-Xavier Arquilliere's 
1934 work: L'augustinisme politique: Essai sur la formation des theo-
ries politiques du moyen-age. Arquilliere's argument is twofold: first, 
Augustine's political thought lacks a careful distinction between the 
natural and supernatural good (as that distinction can be applied to 
realms of social existence). And, second, Augustine's medieval inheri-
tors - especially Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, Gregory VII, and 
Giles of Rome - all pursued the subordination and subsequent absorp-
tion of the civic order by the supernatural order of the church, citing 
Augustine's political thought as their model and authority in doing so. 
Thus "political Augustinianism" comes to designate, for Arquilliere, the 
essence of Christendom's hierarchical organization of religious author-
ity over temporal authority. 
Although Arquilliere's understanding of political Augustinianism 
is more about the historical reception of Augustine's ideas than inter-
pretation of texts, it stands as an important chapter in our argu-
ment. For Arquilliere's thesis is thoroughly shaped by, and represents, 
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Neo-Thomist views of Augustine's political thought prevalent in his 
time, especially those of Pierre Mandonnet and Etienne Gilson. The 
case of Gilson's Neo-Thomist criticism of Augustine's political thought 
is more nuanced than Mandonnet's. Yet both ultimately agree that 
Augustine is missing the appropriate distinction between natural 
and supernatural realms necessary to protect the political commu-
nity from being subordinated to, or absorbed by, the ecclesial com-
munity and its authority. Perhaps this kerfuffle was partially a case of 
inter-Catholic theological rivalry or scapegoating in the wake of World 
War I. Nevertheless, Arquilliere's line of thought signals the divergence 
between political Augustinianism and Thomism in the twentieth cen-
tury, a divergence that has since sedimented. 
Strikingly, no immediate inheritors of the debate made a concerted 
effort to revive Combes's harmonization of Augustine and Aquinas on 
the natural common good after Arquilliere's critique. In the wake of 
World War II, Augustinians sought an alternative route for reconciling 
with liberal democracy and political liberalism - one that emphasized 
the inherent limits and follies of political life as a foundation for human 
flourishing. Rather than naturalness, Augustinians began emphasizing 
the genuine contingency of politics in Augustine's thought. 
The first major response to Arquilliere came from Henri Irenee 
Marrou who, in his 1957 Warburg Lectures, "Civitas Dei, civitas ter-
rena: num tertium quid?," claims that it is not the naturalness of polit-
ical society that secures its value, or guarantees · its intelligibility, in 
Augustine's theology, but rather its temporality. Between the coming 
of Christ and the end of history, Marrou claims, there is the time and 
space of the present age (saeculumJ wherein the two cities -earthly and 
heavenly - are intermingled on their way toward their final eschatolog-
ical destinations. Directly against Arquilliere's thesis, Marrou argues 
that it is the "mixed nature" of the political sphere -necessarily a mix-
ture of ultimate religious identities - that makes the political sphere 
a tertium quid, namely the reality of a saeculum where the two cities 
overlap.? This third thing, Marrou suggests, is the heart of Augustine's 
ambivalent affirmation of the temporal common good found in polit-
ical society. The "natural" does not name an autonomous category of 
value, for Augustine, but rather the primary description of the tempo-
ral, created goods constitutive of political society. Thus the meaning of 
these goods is subject to the vicissitudes of salvation history, apart from 
which their goodness is not ultimately intelligible. Marrou's argument 
is intended to correct Arquilliere's thesis as it also highlights the misin-
terpretations of Augustine by his medieval political inheritors. 
Augustinianisms and Thomisms r8r 
Writing at the same moment as Marrou- in the aftermath of World 
War II and the beginning of the Cold War- Augustinians in the United 
States such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Deane also highlighted 
Augustine's sense of the contingency of politics, except this time with 
darker hues. Not merely temporal, political life for Niebuhr's and 
Deane's Augustine was a contingent intervention of God's providential 
judgment after sin aimed to help restrain chaos and maintain order. 
Thus the unnaturalness of politics - for Marrou and realists such as 
Niebuhr and Deane - is ultimately rooted in Augustine's sense of its 
historical provisionality. This provisionality, such interpreters argue, 
also secures political society's immunity from the ultimate aims of 
human fulfillment. 
These two avenues of thought- Marrou's sense of historical tem-
porality and the realists' sense of postlapsarian contingency - are 
synthesized in what stands as the culminating point of the rapproche-
ment between Augustine and political liberalism: Robert Markus's 
Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine, pub-
lished in 1970.8 Markus makes an intuitive leap from the interpretive 
work of Marrou and Deane, presenting Augustine's political thought as 
the harbinger of secular political liberalism. Markus transitions from 
the time-bound sense of political temporality espoused by Marrou to a 
stronger thesis of neutrality. With Markus's Augustine, political society 
becomes a religion-free zone, given its limited ambitions for practical 
political arrangement without theoretical agreement on matters of com-
prehensive doctrine. Markus's precise understanding of neutrality and 
the limited role of religious argument in the public square finds further 
nuance in his later work, where he adopts a Rawlsian vision of "overlap-
ping consensus" joined with Maritain's "democratic secular faith."9 
For Markus, it is not merely the case that Augustine happens not 
to have espoused a view of the naturalness of politics like that found in 
Thomas Aquinas. Rather, the absence of a natural antecedent for polit-
ical society brings us to the core of Augustine's political thought; for 
if political society is natural it is always open to - indeed it is waiting 
for- its fulfillment in the supernatural common good. But for Markus's 
Augustine, the political is an antiperfectionist institutional arrange-
ment set up merely to secure physical survival. The temporal domain 
of the political remains neutral to religion and autonomous until the 
very end, in anticipation of an eschatological closure that is beyond 
human agency. 
In Markus, we find the reversal of Arquilliere's thesis. Augustine's 
political thought no longer threatens to absorb the temporal into the 
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eternal (without an adequate distinction between the natural and super-
natural). For Markus, there is simply too much eschatological deferral 
and historical ambiguity in Augustine's conception of the two cities to 
legitimate an interpretation like Arquilliere's . Markus argues that the 
Neo-Thomist distinction between the natural and supernatural com-
mon good, applied to the institutions of church and political society, 
threatens to make politics a halfway house for human flourishing, tend-
ing toward religious authority, constantly in need of a grace that can 
perfect it. 
Reversals 
By the end of the twentieth century these reconciliations with political 
liberalism came under fire from within both Augustinian and Thomist 
camps. Critics declared that such mid-century harmonization with 
political liberalism had gone too far, overstretching and reifying the cen-
tral political concepts of the natural (Aquinas) and temporal (Augustine) 
into a pristine, secular space, disconnected from the ultimate super-
natural or eternal good. This line of criticism suggests that such rap-
prochements exhibit conceptual failures that promote accommodation 
to the practices of secular political life - practices that are immune to 
the sacred and inimical to the smaller forms of community necessary 
to pursue the common good. Indeed such practices are beleaguered by 
the demons of excessive individualism and technocratic capitalism that 
ultimately consume liberal democracies and must be resisted. Thus the 
alliance went too far, critics suggested, and dulled the critical edges of 
Augustine's and Aquinas's theology- the very edges that made them 
so helpful for reflecting on modern politics. Indeed, far from restraining 
the excesses of the nation-state or the market, such reconciliation is 
now thought to blind Christians to the ways these arrangements consti-
tute a new (false) sacrality. The most strident critic of Markus's secular 
Augustinian liberalism and its corresponding account of the saeculum 
remains John Milbank. The most forceful challenge to the Neo-Thomist 
reconciliation with political liberalism is Alasdair Macintyre. 
Although there are immense debates in each camp about how pre-
cisely to render the natural and temporal in each thinker, it is taken for 
granted that Augustine and Aquinas are fundamentally opposed on the 
question of the naturalness of the political. For this reason the liber-
alism and antiliberalism divide in Thomism and Augustinianism has 
reached an impasse. Rather than rehearse the terms of the debate or 
choose sides it will be more useful to reexamine the standard interpre-
tive pictures. 
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CORRECTING THE STANDARD INTERPRETATIONS: 
BRINGING AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS CLOSER 
TOGETHER 
Mid-century Augustinian liberals doubled down on the apparently 
unnatural aspects of politics - a merely historical excursion through 
the consequences of sin - rather than searching for the missing natural 
antecedent to political life in Augustine's thought and thus responding 
to Neo-Thomists on their own terms. Part of what made Augustine's 
political thought so attractive to mid-century interpreters was his strong 
sense of the tragic dimension of human existence: the fact that all are 
tainted by original sin and experience some measure of fated powerless-
ness in the face of evil. 
Yet the political often must be carefully teased out of Augustine's 
theology, and the mid-century affinity for tragedy led to a fixation on 
those notoriously dark passages in The City of God that seem most 
like political theory and most helpful in diagnosing the horrors of 
the twentieth century. Take, for example, Augustine's response to 
Cicero's De republica and his claims about the impossibility of true 
justice in this life (2.21; 19.21, 24); Augustine's comparison of emper-
ors and superpirates (4-4); his claims about the similarity between 
the authority exercised by kings and slave owners (19.14-15); the 
vignette of a mournful judge lamenting his duty to access truth by 
torture (19.6); and so on. Note that the majority of these passages 
appear in Book 19 of The City of God- the locus classicus of political 
Augustinianism. And there are good reasons for the authority of this 
particular text. In many ways it is, as Oliver O'Donovan has called 
it, "a microcosm of Augustine's social thought ."ro It also provides the 
perfect length of assigned reading for Augustine's political theology 
in a survey course. 
The problem, however, is that the narrow concentration on this 
text - and its few tenebrous images -led to a distorted perception of the 
character of Augustine's political theology as a whole and its interpre-
tive and practical possibilities. If Book 19 was the ur-text for the shad-
owy postwar Augustine, its fourteenth and fifteenth chapters form the 
interpretive center of it all. It is important to note that these chapters -
more than any other- are used to validate the claim that, for Augustine, 
political society is ultimately rooted in the consequences of original 
sin. What is more, this text is ground zero for those intent on trumpet-
ing the difference between Augustine's and Aquinas's political thought. 
Let us briefly turn to a closer examination of Book 19 and the widely 
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divergent conclusions Augustinians drew from it in the second half of 
the twentieth century. 
Part of the reason City of God 19.I4-I5 is seen to provide such con-
clusive evidence that, for Augustine, political society is rooted in the 
consequences of original sin is that it provides his only account of polit-
ical society as it would have existed in a state of innocence, before the 
fall. The passage appears in the context of Augustine's broader reflection 
on the contingent (in the negative sense of contingent denoting some-
thing unnatural and expressive of temporal or provisional evil) origins 
of the institution of slavery. 
[God] did not intend that a rational creature, made in his own 
image, should have lordship (dominor) over any but irrational crea-
tures: not man over man, but man over beasts. Hence, the first just 
(iustus) men were established as shepherds of flocks, rather than as 
kings of men (reges hominum). This was done so that in this way 
also God might indicate what the order of nature requires, and what 
the desert of sinners demands. By nature, then, in the condition in 
which God first created man, no man is the slave either of another 
man or of sin. (City of God 19.15) 
Augustinian liberals and antiliberals alike read this passage as a blanket 
statement about the origins of political authority, and further evidence 
of Augustine's view of political society as essentially coercive, aimed 
primarily to help restrain evil, vice, and sin. What is striking are the very 
different conclusions drawn from it for thinking about the application of 
Augustine's political thought to modern political life. 
Robert Markus concludes from this passage that the authority that 
would have been exercised in a state of innocence would have been akin 
to the paternal authority of Old Testament patriarchs or of a Roman 
paterfamilias over his wife and children, rather than the political 
authority that a king exercises over his subjects. Markus argues fur-
ther that, in this passage, Augustine is identifying political authority 
in general with the authority of masters over slaves, thus fundamen-
tally casting the institutions and relationships necessary for political 
society into contingent darkness. The key here, for Markus, is that 
the family - and therefore the corresponding institution of the house-
hold - is in some sense natural in a way that political society cannot 
be, for Augustine. Whereas the family can be, hypothetically, ruled 
without domination, this cannot be true of political society. Its contin-
gent origins in human sinfulness and providential judgment exclude it 
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from both naturalness and the possibilities of nondomination. Markus 
claims that, for Augustine: 
Coercive power is part of the essence of political authority, without 
it the state is not a state . . . . Political authority, coercive power, and 
its [institutional] apparatus are what transform society into a state. 
Society, so we may summarize Augustine's view, has its origins in 
the order of naturei the state is a dispensation rooted in sin . . . . The 
terms in which Augustine came to formulate his views on politi-
cally organized society . . . were those which he thought appropri-
ate to the treatment of the institution of slavery, rather than those 
which he applied to the family. 11 
For Markus, the postlapsarian contingency of political authority, and 
thus political society more generally, serves to strengthen his overall 
rendering of Augustine as godfather of a low-flying minimalist liberal 
politics, committed to the relative autonomy, neutrality, and secularity 
of the political sphere. 
Strikingly, John Milbank, Markus's opponent in all things per-
taining to Augustine, shares precisely Markus's view of Augustine on 
politics and original sin. For Milbank, just as for Markus, City of God 
19.14- 15 reveals, "that Augustine regards the institution of slavery after 
the fall, and the institution of political power, as virtually one and the 
same event."n Both authors read Augustine's comments about kingship 
in 19.15 as evidence that he identifies political authority with the author-
ity of masters over slaves. Both conclude that this type of authority is 
contingently rooted in the consequences of original sin. They then read 
backward, as it were, and lump political community and institutions 
into the same category as authority. The equation is complete. Thus, for 
Markus's and Milbank's Augustine, political society is entirely unnatu-
ral in comparison with the family and the institution of the household. 
It is unnatural in the sense that it is not part of the order of human soci-
ality inherent in the grain of creation. 
Yet this shared conclusion leads Milbank to a very different appro-
priation of Augustine's political thought. For Milbank, the origins of 
political society in sin supports an ambitious claim that, for Augustine, 
the church, the ecclesia, is the only truly political society, and that its 
arrival in history spells the undoing of pagan political thought and prac-
tice. At the climax of his argument, Milbank states very baldly that 
"[a]ll political theory in the antique sense is relocated by Christianity 
[beginning with Augustine], as thought about the Church."'3 And, what 
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is more, "the Church itself, as the realized heavenly city, is the telos of 
the salvific process. And as a civitas, the church is, for Augustine, itself 
a 'political' reality."'4 For Milbank's Augustine, the goods constitutive 
of political society do not have their own natural integrity or intelligi-
bility, nor do they have their own provisional secular (or time-bound) 
integrity, as they do for Markus. The realm of politics - that is, the 
"realm of the merely practical" - when "cut off from the ecclesial/' 
Milbank concludes, "is quite simply a realm of sin."'s 
It is Augustinian liberals and antiliberals' shared sense of the tem-
porality of politics - as fundamentally rooted in the murky origins of 
sin - that eliminates any natural antecedent for political society. We 
believe this connection between politics and the contingency of sin 
breeds confusion, either hardening the temporality of the political 
sphere into the rigid secularity of Markus or deflating it into Milbank's 
realm of the merely practical to be subordinated to the ecclesial. For 
without a presupposed natural antecedent in Augustine's thought, 
political society is doomed to swing between these interpretive poles 
of the purely secular space or the fragile temporal realm waiting to be 
swallowed by the ecclesia. 
Markus and others present such a rendering of politics and sin in 
City of God I9.I4-IS in direct opposition to Aquinas's understanding of 
the naturalness of politics. Aquinas treats the origins of political author-
ity twice, first in his Commentary on the Sentences (44.q.2.a.2) and then 
again in Summa Theologiae (ra.96.3, 4). In both instances Aquinas is in 
direct conversation with Augustine's City of God r9.I4-rs . In Thomas's 
treatment of the question in Summa Theologiae, he argues that free 
political rule (as opposed to slave keeping) would have been necessary 
even in humankind's state of created innocence. To make this argu-
ment, Aquinas draws a simple distinction between two types of domin-
ion: the authority of a master over a slave and the authority associated 
with "the office of governing free men" (96.4). The second type has 
membership in an original, prelapsarian goodness - with all its practi-
cal structures for the cause of ruling subordinated to the common good. 
The first type, by contrast, expresses merely a contingent, postlapsarian 
form of domination - the suppression of XX by YY. Aquinas is clear that 
both the household and political society can and should be governed by 
the first type of authority. In making this distinction, Aquinas thinks 
he is closely following Augustine's City of God I9.r4-rs, and is distanc-
ing himself from Aristotle's view of natural slavery in the Politics. In 
Summa Theologiae ra.96-4, Aquinas says: 
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The control of one over another who remains free, can take place 
when the former directs the latter to his own good or to the common 
good. And such dominion would have been found between man and 
man in the state of innocence for two reasons. First, because man is 
naturally a social animal; and in consequence would have lived in 
society, even in the state of innocence. Now there could be no social 
life for many persons living together unless one of their number 
were set in authority to care for the common good. Many individu-
als are, as individuals, interested in a variety of ends .... Secondly, 
if there were one man more wise and righteous than the rest, it 
would have been wrong if such gifts were not exercised on behalf of 
the rest .... So Augustine says, "The just rule not through desire of 
domination, but because it is their duty to give counsel"; and "This 
is ordained by the natural order, for thus did God create man." (City 
of God 19.14- 15) 
Markus, in a revealing appendix to his book, argues that Aquinas's insis-
tence on the naturalness of political authority commits him to a view 
of freedom akin to what Isaiah Berlin calls "positive freedom" - that is, 
the notion "that one remains free, even in being coerced, provided that 
it is for his own or the common good."'6 Augustine, however, Markus 
claims, espouses an entirely negative conception of freedom in the sense 
that any coercion in the political sphere implies a diminution of liberty. '7 
On Markus's reading, political authority, for Augustine, remains 
entirely (and perhaps tragically) tethered to the judicial and penal opera-
tions of coercion. Aquinas is therefore merely mistaken, on Markus's 
account, insofar as he sees any positive role for political authority in the 
work of virtue cultivation or overall human flourishing. Aquinas's dis-
tinction of two kinds of rule is a pregnant one for understanding the pos-
sibility of noncoercive political relations bound by law. Note, however, 
that Markus's insistence on Augustine's protoliberalism (of a distinc-
tive kind) is inflected in his interpretive debate around these texts. We 
believe he is mistaken. In particular, Markus's borrowed modern notion 
of freedom as noninterference distorts more than it reveals with respect 
to relevant differences between Augustine and Aquinas. Their accounts 
of freedom, and subsequent debates about whether politics is essentially 
coercive, simply do not map onto these distinctions. A more productive 
reading of these texts would emphasize Augustine and Aquinas's shared 
indebtedness to the republican tradition of political thinking on liberty 
and domination, as can be found in the work of Peter J. Burnell. 
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The full exegetical details of this interpretive debate are manifold 
and would require a lengthier treatment of their discussions of mas-
tery and servitude, and their different accounts of the nature of law, 
east of Eden. Let it be sufficient to note that Aquinas saw his presenta-
tion of human sociality and the naturalness of political authority in ST 
ra.96-3-4 as standing in fundamental agreement with Augustine's City 
of God r9.I4-I5. Consider the similarities of their approaches to politi-
cal authority in these two texts. 
First, the natural, for Augustine and Aquinas, signifies the order of 
creation as it existed in a state of innocence before the fall. Second, the 
question of the naturalness of political society for each thinker is not a 
question of the raw aggregate of individuals who form a civil commu-
nity, but rather of the naturalness of the forms of rule or authority that 
govern such a community. Third, implied in each author's account of 
authority is a picture of the profound fabric of political authority, civil 
community, and the common good unique to political community. 
Both Augustine and Aquinas endorse a conception of political society as 
a mesh of roles, institutions, and obligations in which the accent mark 
in the formation of political community falls on the authority of polit-
ical officials. Their analysis of political society centers on the virtues 
necessary to fulfill the role-specific obligations associated with political 
office and the direction and formation of citizens. Finally, Augustine 
and Aquinas both fundamentally agree that humankind's natural soci-
ality expresses itself in a series of concentric "moral circles" extending 
outward from the individual to the family, civil society, ecclesial com-
munity, and ultimately to all human beings and God. Contra Markus, 
we believe this is the most plausible way to read City of God 19. Each of 
these spheres of community, in turn, is embedded in an institution (e.g., 
household, commonwealth, church) and plays a role in human flourish-
ing. For both authors, then, the temporal common good of political soci-
ety provides a genuine, albeit incomplete, form of happiness. 
The clearest evidence of Augustine's understanding of the "natural-
ness" (in the sense of original created goodness) of political authority is 
found not in City of God I9.14-15 but in his advice to public officials in 
his letters. There we find an Augustinian account of political leadership. 
There we get glimpses of public officials fulfilling their role-specific 
obligations in a distinctively Christian way - a way that supports the 
public good and also openly directs it toward the eternal good. Indeed, 
the letters in Augustine's correspondence with public officials such 
as Marcellinus and Macedonius are now being recognized by many 
as the center, not the periphery, of Augustine's political thought (see 
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especially Letters 138 to Marcellinus and Letter 155 to Macedonius). For 
it is in these texts that we find Augustine at his most practical, offering 
detailed descriptions of the ways Christian faith should influence the 
performance of one's public responsibilities. Robert Dodaro's work on 
Augustine has brought these neglected texts into the mainstream of 
dialogue about Augustine's political ethics, against scholars in the more 
11realist 11 tradition of Reinhold Niebuhr and Herbert Deane. 
Augustine's focus in these texts is the public official's soul, not 
political regimes. His political language is that of virtuous rule, not 
church and state. The transformation of political society by Christian 
faith begins at the level of the political official's role-specific obliga-
tions - specifically as the virtues necessary to carry out these obliga-
tions in the governance of political society are reinterpreted in light of 
the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. 
Illustrative of this approach is Letter 155 to Macedonius, who was 
imperial vicar of Africa during the years 413-414 AD, in which he 
oversaw the administration of justice in all of Roman Africa. At some 
point during Macedonius's tenure at this post, Augustine appealed to 
him for clemency on behalf of a criminal condemned to capital pun-
ishment. Through their exchange of letters (152, 153, 155) we learn that 
Macedonius grants the appeal, and Augustine writes to thank him and 
congratulate him on his decision. The climax of Augustine's argument 
to Macedonius in Letter 155 is that Macedonius must now learn to prac-
tice the political virtues required by his office with the twofold goal of 
tending the people's temporal and eternal well-being: 
The source of happiness is not one thing for a human being and 
another for a city: a city is indeed nothing other than a like-minded 
mass of human beings. Take all your virtues: all the prudence with 
which you try to serve human affairs, all the courage with which 
you allow no enemy's wickedness to frighten you, all the moderation 
through which you keep yourself from corruption when surrounded 
by the rottenness of contemptible human habits, all the justice which 
you use to judge correctly in assigning to each his due. Suppose that 
you employ all these virtues in toiling and struggling merely for the 
physical security of those you want to do well. . .. Then neither your 
virtues nor the happiness that comes from them will be real. . .. If 
any of your governing, however informed by the virtues, is directed 
only to the final aim of allowing human beings to suffer no unjust 
hardships in the flesh; and if you think that it is no concern of yours 
to what purpose they put the peace that you struggle to provide for 
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them (that is, to speak directly, how they worship the true God, with 
whom the fruit of peaceful life is found), then all that effort towards 
the life of true happiness will not benefit you at all. '8 
Letter I 55 to Macedonius turns out to be an extended discussion of 
the relationship between virtue and happiness as it is practiced and 
experienced in the life of a political ruler. It provides an insight into 
Augustine's understanding of the good use of political authority that 
goes well beyond City of God I 9. I 4- I 5. It also reveals that political soci-
ety is "natural," for Augustine, insofar as it is a constitutive element of 
the social well-being that human beings were created to pursue. 
The analogue to Augustine's account of virtue and happiness in these 
letters to public officials is Aquinas's account of the way the infused 
theological virtues of faith, hope, and love orient human beings to the 
eternal common good and thereby help direct their use and experience 
of temporal goods. ' 9 Although we must pay attention to the relationship 
and differences between Augustine's and Aquinas's understanding of the 
limited natural and temporal qualities of the common good achieved 
in political life (especially through law), they are in agreement in their 
description of how the gifts of the theological virtues are necessary to 
orient human beings toward eternal happiness. A common link between 
Augustine's and Aquinas's political thought is their shared Neoplatonic 
framework in thinking about how the theological virtues reorient the 
practice of the cardinal virtues in temporal political life. Although 
scholars have begun tracing the Neoplatonic elements in Augustine's 
thinking about the theological and political virtues, more work needs 
to be done on these same elements in Aquinas's thought relative to 
more familiar accounts of Aristotelianism and natural law (especially 
Aquinas's account of whether or not cardinal virtues remain in heaven). 
On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus (De regno ) can also be read as 
Aquinas's (or at least a very early Thomistic) presentation of the ways 
that the infused virtues fundamentally reorient one's responsibilities 
for tending the temporal, political common good. The text, admittedly 
of disputed authorship, applies a Thomistic conception of the theolog-
ical and political virtues in the instruction of an actual public official. 
TOWARD A CONTEMPORARY AUGUSTINIAN-THOMIST 
POLITICAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY 
In many ways, Augustine's age is closer to our own than Aquinas's, 
for the institutional relationship between church and political society, 
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bishop and magistrate, was still very much in flux. For Augustine, the 
relationship of political life and Christian faith is a matter of virtue, 
worked out on the battlefield of the public official's soul. Although 
Augustine's statesmanship approach to politics can strike the contempo-
rary mind as elitist and underdeveloped in terms of structural analysis, 
it holds principles that are transferable for a more popular, democratic 
Christian virtue ethics of citizenship. This democratic translation has 
been the trend in contemporary political Augustinianism since the work 
of Dodaro, Gregory, and Mathewes. 
Twentieth-century attempts to construct institutional renderings 
of Aquinas's natural and supernatural common good, or Augustine's 
temporal and eternal good, that can be neatly applied to church and 
political society have run their course and climaxed in the stalemate of 
a liberal and antiliberal debate over secularity. These distinctions pri-
marily apply, for each thinker, to the virtues and corresponding goods 
associated with them. Both Augustine and Aquinas think of political 
theology more in terms of virtue ethics than institutional analysis. 
Ultimately, political questions are questions about the transformation 
of the political (cardinal) virtues by faith, hope, and love. And these 
questions are, in turn, questions about what it means to refer the com-
mon good achieved in political life toward its ultimate end in God, who 
is eternal happiness. 
Thus the genuinely constructive work that lies before political 
Thomists and Augustinians falls into three categories. First we must 
identify the political virtues- especially those most relevant to contem-
porary democratic life - and describe what their reorientation by faith, 
hope, and love might look like. Part of this description brings about 
the second constructive task of identifying exemplars - both past and 
present, statesmen and citizens - who embody these virtues and their 
transformation through faith, hope, and love. Once such virtues and 
embodied transformations can be identified, we will be in a better posi-
tion to describe what the referral of the natural or temporal common 
good toward eternal happiness might amount to at the level of political 
practice. 
Referral brings us to the grand question in Augustine's and Aquinas's 
political thought: what is the relationship between earthly happiness 
and the ultimate form of happiness found only with God in eternity? 
That is, what is the relationship between political and eschatological 
eudaimonism? And, how do we avoid the previous errors of absorption 
(Christendom) and separation (secularism) in answering such a ques-
tion? Note that both the natural and supernatural distinction, and 
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temporal and eternal one, can lead to these errors if broadly applied at 
the institutional level. The way to avoid the twin errors of absorption 
or separation is to focus not simply on institutions but on individuals; 
not on raw individuals, but socially coded individuals in their distinc-
tive roles, as members of all levels of society and as tenders of partic-
ular common goods who are in need of specific virtues. Such virtues 
are always threatened by unjust social and political practices. Getting 
a grip on these questions is more fundamental to the political thought 
of Augustine and Aquinas than institutional questions of church and 
political society, and yet the two sorts of question are never ultimately 
disconnected. For both thinkers the church is the locus of virtue forma-
tion and of the relationships necessary for discernment, and political 
society is the place where political virtue must be transformed by faith, 
hope, and love. 
Responding to such questions, no doubt, will be informed by the 
sort of philosophical and theological reflection characteristic of contem-
porary political theology, often at odds with much of political theory 
resistant to such questions (including the work of many self-identified 
Augustinian and Thomist political thinkers). Concepts like natural-
ness, necessity, coercion, domination, and the common good remain 
high on the agenda for any theological interpretation of politics. In fact, 
we have highlighted areas where the political implications of major 
developments in theological scholarship on these thinkers remain 
undertheorized. But, as the best critics of our actual politics rightly have 
noted, theory alone cannot support the type of social change required 
to transcend the distinctive challenges of modern political communi-
ties and their economic arrangements. Here, with Macintyre, we share 
many of the concerns about abstraction and philosophical exclusion 
noted by critics of liberalism and its characteristic bureaucratic and pro-
cedural expressions. Further theorizing of theory's relation to practice, 
or even Augustine's relation to Aquinas on supernatural grace, also will 
not meet these challenges. Prophetic critique, moreover, risks its own 
moral and political hazards. 
Despite many valid theological criticisms of their work, Augustinians 
and Thomists in the mid-twentieth century like Reinhold Niebuhr and 
John Courtney Murray sought to provide a genuinely political Christian 
political theory, attentive to the details of political structures and pro-
cesses without sacrificing normative reflection on the demands of polit-
icalleadership and citizenship. 20 Contemporary Augustinian-Thomists 
can, and should, still learn from these forebears and be grateful for their 
concerns about the political institutions of a free society. Their concerns, 
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attentive to political theory and political science, stand in stark con-
trast with the ecclesial focus of more recent work in political theology. 
Our rejection of the "institutional level" opposition of Augustine and 
Aquinas serves a different purpose. It may be that the debate over polit-
icalliberalism has truncated our receptions of their political theologies. 
In fact, in addition to emphasis on the distinctive liturgical practices for 
training Christian virtue, further work in political theology might best 
be served by attending in more focused ways to how Augustinian and 
Thomist perspectives can inform debates about issues like mass incar-
ceration, immigration, and international law. 
Caricatures have their pedagogical value, even in the formation of 
holiness. We do not deny differences between Augustine's more consis-
tent Platonism, and Aquinas's debts to Aristotle. Their rhetorical style 
and their visions of politics took shape in radically different histori-
cal contexts. But the demands of contemporary politics require some-
thing more than sweaty Augustinian "pessimism" and serene Thomist 
"optimism," let alone Augustinian "grace" and Thomist "nature." 
Our effort to historicize and interrupt conventional pictures by bring-
ing Augustine and Aquinas closer together is one attempt to open new 
ways of addressing such challenges without default recourse to familiar 
tropes. Dislodging their opposition, without collapsing their different 
construals of human agency confronted by proximate and final ends, 
might liberate and generate new imaginations for both political engage-
ment and practical reasoning. Such a politics remains a human enter-
prise, adequate to our creatureliness in time, but no less divine. 
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